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The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality
Jennifer Levi† & Daniel Redman‡

I. INTRODUCTION
It is a basic fact of biology that every person requires access to the
bathroom. Today, for transgender people,1 this right of access is often
held hostage by thoughtless and uninformed authorities. As a result of
bathroom discrimination, transgender people frequently suffer health
problems and face violence or harassment. Bathroom inequality is one
of the greatest barriers to full integration of transgender people in Ameri
can life. And, even more, opponents of transgender-inclusive nondiscri
mination laws have systematically embraced a strategy of leveraging the
discomfort and fears people have around bathroom safety and privacy to
foment opposition to transgender equality.
This Article offers a new set of arguments for transgender equality
based on a little-known series of cases in which courts declined to en
force cross-dressing laws against transgender defendants. As shown be
low, the arguments brought by the defenders of these laws closely mirror
the arguments brought today in favor of bathroom discrimination. In this
Article, we put both the bathroom and cross-dressing debates in histori
cal context, draw out the underlying reasoning in the two sets of cases,
and argue that the reasoning that supports bathroom discrimination is as
flawed as the reasoning behind criminal cross-dressing laws. The analy
† Professor, Western New England College School of Law; Transgender Rights Project Director,
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders.
‡ J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); B.A., Johns Hopkins Univer
sity; Attorney, National Center for Lesbian Rights.
1. We use the term transgender throughout the Article as an umbrella term that is used to de
scribe a wide range of identities and experiences, including but not limited to: pre-operative, post
operative, and non-operative transsexual people; male and female cross-dressers (sometimes referred
to as “transvestites,” “drag queens,” or “drag kings”); intersexed individuals; and men and women,
regardless of sexual orientation, whose appearance or characteristics are perceived to be gender
atypical. PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS AND
THE POLICY INSTITUTE OF THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 3 (JUNE 19, 2000), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf.
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sis also suggests that, just as the arguments for cross-dressing prohibi
tions have not withstood advances in public understanding of transgender
people and their lives, neither will the arguments for bathroom discrimi
nation.
In Part I, we discuss the current state of the law, present personal
testimonials of transgender people denied bathroom access, place the
bathroom debate in historical context, and show how that debate evolved
to the present day. In Part II, we analyze the body of case law dealing
with bathroom access and discrimination, outlining the types of argu
ments brought by anti-transgender advocates to justify withholding bath
room access: preventing fraud and crime, discouraging overt homosex
uality, and enforcing gender norms. In Part III, we analyze the body of
case law dealing with the cross-dressing laws, demonstrate that defen
dants used the same arguments being used today in the bathroom context,
and show how the courts rejected these arguments. In Part IV, we com
pare the two bodies of case law and offer new arguments for bathroomaccess equality.
II. BATHROOM EQUALITY: HISTORY OF THE DEBATE
A. Contemporary Situation
The past two decades have brought many advances in equal rights
for transgender individuals. Beginning in the early 1990s, the queer
movement began to advocate inclusive nondiscrimination protections
that would include gender identity and expression as protected characte
ristics. In 1993, Minnesota became the first state to add language to its
state nondiscrimination law to ensure that transgender people would be
protected.2 The second state to do so was Rhode Island in 2001.3 Today,
thirteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination based
on gender identity,4 and a number of other states continue to pursue
2. Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08
(2009) (employment); MINN. STAT. § 363A.09 (2009) (housing/property); MINN. STAT. § 363A.13
(2009) (education); MINN. STAT. § 363A.16 (2009) (credit).
3. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-3 (2009).
4. California, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (2010); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-402, 
502 (2009); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE §§ 2-1402.11, .21, .41 (2010); Hawaii, HAW. REV.
STAT. § 515-3 (2009); Illinois, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103 (2009); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 216.6,
.8–10 (2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571, 4581, 4595, 4601 (2010); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. § 363A.02 (2009); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-9.1, -12.5, -12, -4 (West
2010; New Mexico, N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7 (2009); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2009); R.I.
GEN. LAWS, §§ 28-5-6, 34-37-3, 11-24-2.1 (2009); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 4503,
10403 (2009); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2009). There are, of course, variations
among these laws including whether, for example, the laws add “gender identity,” “gender identity
and expression,” or some variation of that language to the law as well as whether the law adds a new
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comparable laws.5 In addition, cities across the country have added
gender identity and expression to municipal nondiscrimination ordin
ances.6
That said, transgender people—much like gay, lesbian, and bisex
ual people—still lack nondiscrimination protections under both federal
and most states’ laws in employment, housing, and public accommoda
tions. This lack of protection is particularly apparent in the issue of bath
room access. Federal regulations require that all employers provide

category of protected characteristics or modifies existing ones such as “sexual orientation;” see, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44) (2009) (defining “Sexual orientation” as “having or being perceived as
having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or female
ness”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C) (2009) (defining “Sexual orientation” as “a person’s
actual or perceived heterosexuality, bisexuality, homosexuality or gender identity or expression”);
see also, CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 1, at 41–44. Regardless of the approach, the goal of such
laws is to ensure that anyone who is gender non-conforming in some way (or transgender) is pro
tected by the laws’ reach.
5. See, e.g., An Act Relative to Gender-Based Discrimination and Hate Crimes, H.B. 1722,
185th Sess. (Mass. 2007); An Act Concerning Discrimination, H.B. 5723, 2008 Sess. (Conn. 2008).
Much has already been written about why adding gender identity and expression to state laws is
important to ensure that transgender people are protected against discrimination. While existing sex
discrimination laws should and could protect many transgender people, see, e.g., Smith v. Salem,
Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosa v.
Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d
293 (D.D.C. 2008), historically many courts have read into sex discrimination laws an exclusion
from the laws’ protection. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers
v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprin
cipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender
People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37 (Fall 2000). As a result, adding clear and explicit pro
tections for transgender people has become an important part of transgender advocacy.
6. See U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity
LAW
&
POLICY
INST.
(2010),
or
Expression,
TRANSGENDER
http://transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm#jurisdictions ((in reverse chronological order) Nash
ville, TN; Kalamazoo, MI; Broward, FL; Columbia, SC; Detroit, MI; Gainesville, FL; Hamtramck,
MI; Kansas City, MO; Oxford, OH; Lake Worth, FL; Milwaukee, WI; Palm Beach County, FL;
Saugatuck, MI; West Palm Beach, FL; Bloomington, IN; Cincinnati, OH; Easton, PA; Ferndale, MI;
Hillsboro, OR; Johnson County, IA; King County, WA; Lansdowne, PA; Lansing, MI; Swarthmore,
PA; West Chester, PA; Gulfport, FL; Indianapolis, IN; Lincoln City, OR; Northampton, MA; Alba
ny, NY; Austin, TX; Beaverton, OR; Bend, OR; Burien, WA; Oakland, CA; Miami Beach, FL;
Tompkins County, NY; Carbondale, IL; Covington, KY; El Paso, TX; Ithaca, NY; Key West, FL;
Lake Oswego, OR; Monroe Co., FL; Peoria, IL; San Diego, CA; Scranton, PA; Springfield, IL;
University City, MO; Allentown, PA; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA; Buffalo, NY; Chicago, IL; Cook
County, IL; Dallas, TX; Decatur, IL; East Lansing, MI; Erie County, PA; New Hope, PA; New York
City, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Salem, OR; Tacoma, WA; Denver, CO; Huntington Woods, MI; Mult
nomah Co., OR; Rochester, NY; Suffolk County, NY; Atlanta, GA; Boulder, CO; DeKalb, IL; Mad
ison, WI; Portland, OR; Ann Arbor, MI; Jefferson County, KY; Lexington-Fayette Co., KY; Louis
ville, KY; Tucson, AZ; Benton County, OR; Santa Cruz County, CA; New Orleans, LA; Toledo,
OH; West Hollywood, CA; York, PA; Cambridge, MA; Evanston, IL; Olympia, WA; Pittsburgh,
PA; Ypsilanti, MI; Iowa City, IA; Grand Rapids, MI; San Francisco, CA; Santa Cruz, CA; St. Paul,
MN; Seattle, WA; Harrisburg, PA; Los Angeles, CA; Urbana, IL; Champaign, IL; Minneapolis,
MN).
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access to restrooms,7 yet the dearth of federal gender-nondiscrimination
protection permits employers to discriminate as to who can use which
bathroom. In states without transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination
laws, it is not uncommon for a transgender person to be forced to use a
bathroom that is inconsistent with his or her gender identity—an expe
rience this Article refers to as bathroom discrimination.8 This treatment
constitutes discrimination because it ignores the real and central element
of a transgender person’s identity—his or her gender identity—while
respecting the gender identity of persons who are not transgender.
Even in states and cities with transgender-inclusive nondiscrimina
tion laws, transgender people face significant barriers to equal bathroom
access. In a 2002 survey conducted by the San Francisco Human Rights
Commission, nearly 50% of transgender respondents reported harass
ment or assault in a public bathroom, notwithstanding California’s trans
gender-inclusive legal protections. Because of this, the report concluded,
“[M]any transgender people avoid public bathrooms altogether and can
develop health problems as a result.”9 One respondent wrote:
I have spent so many hours avoiding public multi-stall bathrooms
that I have damaged my bladder and put pressure on my kidneys.
The problem was a daily one. I’d think about where I was going,

7. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(d)(2)(i) (2010) (“Lavatories shall be made available in all places of
employment.”). The history of bathroom sex segregation is summarily explained in C.J. Griffin,
Workplace Restroom Policies in Light of New Jersey’s Gender Identity Protection, 61 RUTGERS L.
REV. 409, 414–15 (2009); see also Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals in Public Restrooms: Law, Cultur
al Geography and Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 673, 685
(2009).
8. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding a
ruling by the District of Utah that it was legally permissible to fire a transgender woman because
“use of women’s public restrooms by a biological male could result in liability”); Johnson v. Fresh
Mark, Inc., 98 F. App’x 461, 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding district court ruling that plaintiff had
failed to state a claim for sex discrimination against employer who fired transgender female em
ployee for refusing to use the men’s restroom); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 748, 749 (upholding district
court ruling that denial of bathroom access to a transgender employee followed by termination is
“not within the ambit” of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
850 F. Supp 284, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss civil rights suit
brought by transgender plaintiff who suffered discrimination through, among other things, denial of
appropriate bathroom access); Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 54 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005) (holding that a landlord could refuse to renew a non-profit’s lease because the non
profit’s transgender clients used the restrooms in the building). Although New York does not in
clude gender identity or expression in its civil rights law, courts have held for transgender plaintiffs
in other contexts based on disability or sex discrimination claims. See, e.g., Doe v. Bell, 754
N.Y.S.2d 846, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
9. TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, PEEING IN PEACE, A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR TRANSGENDER
ACTIVISTS AND ALLIES, 3 (2005), available at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/PIP%20Resource
%20Guide.pdf.
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what bathrooms I’d have access to, how much I drank during the
day, whether I’d be with people who could help stand guard . . . .10

Transgender people are forced out of employment and school be
cause they are denied access to bathrooms. In Goins v. West, a transgender plaintiff in a civil rights lawsuit argued that she faced construc
tive termination because her employer refused to allow her to use the
women’s restroom.11 Among other types of discrimination that transgender youth face, bathroom-based discrimination is one of the top
forces pushing them to drop out of school.12
Bathroom discrimination is real and terrifying. Leslie Feinberg, a
transgender activist and author, writes:
We live under the constant threat of horrifying violence. We have
to worry about what bathroom to use when our bladders are aching.
We are forced to consider whether we’ll be dragged out of a bath
room and arrested or face a fistfight while our bladders are still ach
ing . . . . Human beings must use toilets.13

Feinberg describes the violence that transgender people face in the
bathroom: “If I go into the women’s bathroom, am I prepared for the
shouting and shaming? Will someone call security or the cops? If I use
the men’s room, am I willing to fight my way out? Am I really ready for
the violence that could ensue?”14
The harassment and violence from civilians is bad, but police bru
tality is often much worse.
[P]olice officers often harass or abuse transgender and gender non
conforming people regardless of which sex-segregated bathroom
they use. This harassment intensifies when coupled with the stereo
typing of trans people as sexual predators. As such, the use of the
‘wrong’ bathroom . . . often results in arrests for crimes such as
public lewdness, public obscenity, or public indecency. Refusing to
comply with or simply questioning a police officer’s direction as to
which bathroom the individual must use can often lead to charges
such as resisting arrest or disorderly conduct.15

10. TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, THE PROBLEM, available at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/
trans/pdfs/SBAC%20Fact%20Sheet-lem%20handout.pdf.
11. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
12. See Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Oct. 11, 2000)
(school attempted to bar student from attending in clothes consistent with her gender identity and
suspended her for using the women’s restroom).
13. LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 68 (1998).
14. Id. at 68–69.
15. Pooja Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Impact on
Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315, 326 (2009).
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While the situation is unacceptable today, in the past it was much worse.
One guidebook for transgender people published in 1995 advised transgender people “to carry with [them] at all times a psychologist’s let
ter . . . .”—like a passport in hostile territory—in case they were stopped
by police.16 According to Amnesty International, “Bathroom access is
sues become more of an issue with intersecting identities—people of
color, homeless and young people are already under higher scrutiny.”17
Activists have already organized significantly around this issue. At
the University of California—Santa Barbara, a team of students, staff,
and community members founded an organization called People In
Search of Safe and Accessible Restrooms (“PISSAR”) to lobby the
school to make bathrooms safe and accessible for transgender and dis
abled people.18 They were motivated by the fact that “[f]or those of us
whose appearance or identity does not quite match the ‘man’ or ‘woman’
signs on the door, bathrooms can be the sites of violence and harassment,
making it very difficult for us to use them safely or comfortably.”19 Ac
tivists have even set up a website, Safe2Pee.org, to “create a resource
where people who do not feel comfortable with traditional public re
strooms can find safe alternatives.”20
B. Bathroom Discrimination Reflects Broader Animus
Restricting the ability to use bathrooms has long served as yet
another way to marginalize minority and disempowered groups. As C.J.
Griffin writes, discriminatory bathroom rules are “a tool of oppression
used against many individuals and communities.”21 As Griffin points
out, “[T]he lack of bathroom facilities has been an excuse to keep wom
en out of areas traditionally dominated by men. For example, history
suggests that women were only allowed into Yale Medical School after a
female applicant’s wealthy father donated money to build a women’s
restroom.”22 As for race, the South’s notorious Jim Crow laws were de
signed to ensure white hegemony as much as to prescribe social norms.
“Racially-segregated facilities taught both whites and blacks that certain
16. SHEILA KIRK, M.D. & MARTINE ROTHBLATT, J.D., MEDICAL, LEGAL & WORKPLACE
ISSUES FOR THE TRANSSEXUAL: A GUIDE FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSFORMATION 114 (1995).
17. AMNESTY INT’L, STONEWALLED: POLICE ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT AGAINST LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S. 20 (2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/ou
tfront/stonewalled/report.pdf.
18. SIMONE CHESS, ET AL., Calling all restroom revolutionaries!, in THAT’S REVOLTING:
QUEER STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 216–17 (Matt Bernstein Sycamore ed., Soft Skull
Press 2008).
19. Id. at 217.
20. SAFE2PEE.ORG, http://safe2pee.org (last visited March 2, 2010).
21. Griffin, supra note 7, at 410.
22. Id. at 420.
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kinds of contacts were forbidden because whites would be degraded by
the contact with the blacks . . . . [Often] in the workplace, blacks had to
travel great distances to use the restroom, while white restrooms were
generally just off the shop floor.”23
Ratcheting up the rhetoric around bathroom discrimination is nei
ther a contemporary phenomenon, nor has its exclusive focus or purpose
been to marginalize transgender people. It began in a more opaque form
with the movement opposing passage of a federal Equal Rights Amend
ment. The proposed Amendment, passed by both houses of Congress in
1972, would have added to the Constitution a provision stating, “Equality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.”
Although the ERA garnered significant support among the states, it
ultimately came up three states shy of ratification (thirty-eight states be
ing required) because of substantial efforts by its opponents. The most
prominent critic and opponent of the ERA was Phyllis Schlafly, a con
servative activist and founder of the Eagle Forum. Schlafly strongly
pushed the bathroom argument to stir up fears about the impact of the
ERA on gender norms. She also focused on the impact of the ERA on
the military and on marriage.24 As one pamphlet distributed by Schlaf
ly’s Eagle Forum stated: “ERA will not protect privacy between the sex
es in hospitals, prisons, schools, or public accommodations.”25
Many scholars and commentators today either ridicule the shared
bathroom objection or marginalize its seriousness relative to the impor
tance of having a sex-based nondiscrimination commitment.26 Yet, the
centrality of the bathroom objection to ERA opponents’ arguments is
clear. Historians acknowledge it, and in a 2007 article discussing efforts
by members of Congress to reintroduce the ERA, the Washington Post
characterized Schlafly’s opposition as focusing on “women being drafted

23. Id. at 424 (internal citations omitted).
24. JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (Univ. Chicago Press 1986).
25. EAGLE FORUM, ERA—DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT MEANS?, http://www.eagleforum.org/
era/2003/ERA-Brochure.shtml (July 6, 2010).
26. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 24; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement,
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1339
(2006) (referring to the current debate about the ERA as focusing on “some funny business about
bathrooms and bras.”); Martha Craig Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution; Where we are at the
End of the Century, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 (April 2000) (suggesting that the failure of the ERA did
not significantly hurt women because “[w]hen Congress sent the equal rights amendment to the
states for ratification in 1972, ERA opponents warned of dire consequences: co-ed bathrooms, wom
en drafted into the military [and] the repeal of spousal support laws . . . . The ERA failed, but the
consequences happened anyway. Unisex bathrooms are in college dorms around the country.”).
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by the military and . . . public unisex bathrooms.”27 Opponents of the
ERA offered no explanation for their concern regarding shared restroom
usage.28 They relied, in much the same way as opponents of transgender
nondiscrimination laws do, on the visceral reaction people had to the
suggestion that norms around bathroom access might change.
While the federal ERA captured national attention, many states
adopted local civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sex in employment, education, credit, housing, and public accommoda
tions, among other areas. Some of these states, prompted by Schlafly’s
activism, included bathroom exceptions to their nondiscrimination
laws.29 Not one recorded case exists in any state—from before or after
the passage of these laws—in which a plaintiff challenged the constitu
tionality of sex-segregated bathrooms under a state ERA. The existence
of these statutory exceptions, however, speaks to the influence of Schlaf
ly and others on the debate and the centrality of bathroom hysteria to that
legislative development.30
C. Bathrooms as the Focus of Anti-Transgender Activism Today
While Schlafly presented fears of a unisex bathroom revolution
where women would be forced to share space with men, subsequent con
servative activists have narrowed the bathroom argument to focus pri
27. Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar. 28,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032702357.html.
28. See generally FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA SINCE 1960 390 (1999) (discussing types of arguments used in oppositions of the Equal
Rights Amendment); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 68–69 (1989) (discussing the traditional distinction maintained between the sexes).
29. For example, Rhode Island adopted a rule of interpretation at the time it passed a state law
prohibiting sex discrimination explaining that “[n]othing contained in [the nondiscrimination laws]
that refers to ‘sex’ shall be construed to mandate joint use of restrooms . . . by males and females.”
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3.1 (2009). (There are no reported cases dealing with this law.) New Jer
sey is another state which when it added “sex” to its nondiscrimination laws, created an exemption
from its laws for public accommodations that are usually single-sex. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. §
10:5-12(f)(1) (2010) (“nothing contained herein shall be construed to bar any place of public ac
commodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and
which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp, or resort camp, bathhouse,
dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school
or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, provided individ
uals shall be admitted based on their gender identity or expression. . . .”). So too in New Mexico,
state law exempts bathrooms from the sex discrimination laws. N.M. STAT. § 28-1-9(E) (2010).
(There are no reported cases dealing with this law.) Minnesota also has a bathroom exception to the
public accommodations provision of the sex discrimination law. MINN. STAT. § 363A.24 (2010).
Notably, all four of these states have since added laws prohibiting discrimination based on gender
identity and expression that make no reference to the earlier bathroom exceptions.
30. Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 419, 445–46 (2008) (“An extensive search has revealed no case brought under any state ERA
challenging the norm of public single-sex bathrooms.”).
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marily on transgender people. That focus has intensified over time as
more and more states have added gender identity and expression as ex
plicitly protected characteristics.
In Rhode Island, for instance, adding gender identity and expres
sion to the nondiscrimination law raised little debate at all and included
no specific emphasis on bathrooms. There was one public hearing on the
bill; the discussion focused almost entirely on legislators’ confusion as to
why adding sexual orientation back in 1995 was insufficient to cover
transgender people. The scant legislative history reflects that “[g]ender
identity and expression” was added to the public accommodations nondi
scrimination law in 2001 to “close [the] loophole” within the thencurrent civil rights laws that failed to explicitly protect transgender
people from discrimination by extending to transgender people “the same
basic rights to housing, employment and public access afforded to other
members of the community.”31
Over time, however, objections based on bathroom concerns have
gained strength. Recent experiences advocating for such legislation in
Connecticut and Massachusetts reveal that a major point of opposition to
transgender equality laws focuses on the impact such laws would have
on bathroom usage.32
In Massachusetts, activists closely modeled their strategy to add
gender identity to the nondiscrimination law on the Rhode Island expe
rience. The language of the bills is nearly identical. In the Massachu
setts experience, the first public hearing was before the Joint Committee
on the Judiciary. The experience of that public hearing, however, was
markedly different from the one in Rhode Island. In Massachusetts, do
zens of transgender people poignantly testified about their experiences of
discrimination across a range of issue areas, including employment, edu
cation, public accommodations, public safety, and others.
The opposition, however, painted the entire pro-transgender equali
ty effort as “the bathroom bill,” and focused on that almost exclusively.
In a publication titled “Yes, HB1728 is a ‘Bathroom Bill,’” and with a
heading reading, “Protect Women and Children,” the Massachusetts
Family Institute (“MFI”) claimed that under the law.

31. Press Release, The Legislative Press and Public Information Bureau, Bill Would Extend
Civil
Rights
to
Transgendered
Persons
(May
2,
2001),
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/leg_press/2001/may/Ajello%20civilrights.htm (quoting Representative
Edith H. Ajello, sponsor of the bill that ultimately enacted 2001-H5920A).
32. Amy Contrada, The Coming Nightmare of a Transsexual Rights and Hate Crimes Law in
Massachusetts: Why Bill H1722 Must Be Defeated; Part 3: Public Accommodations,
MASSRESISTANCE (2008), http://www.massresistance.org/docs/govt08/tran_law_study/part3.html.
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any man can legally gain access to facilities reserved for women
and girls by indicating, verbally or non-verbally, that he inwardly
feels female at the moment. There is no way to distinguish between
someone suffering from “Gender Identity Disorder” and a sexual
predator looking to exploit this law. This is the dangerous reality of
this bill.33

MFI set up a website, NoBathroomBill.com, featuring a YouTube
video of a threatening-looking man following a young girl into a bath
room.34 It attempted to deflect allegations of anti-transgender bias by
stating, “We believe that transgender persons should enjoy the same le
gal protections as other citizens and be free of harm or harassment[,] . . .
but invading everyone else’s privacy and safety is going too far.”35 Yet,
the underlying message came through. One speaker in opposition to the
bill stated,
I know from teaching young children for so many years that they
are so innocent. Seeing an adult, or older child dressed very diffe
rently, especially in and around the school, would be extremely
frightening to many young children, not to mention the comfort lev
el of other adults working in the school.36

According to Kris Mineau, the leader of MFI, upon adoption of the
proposed bill, “[n]othing would prevent a sexual predator from pretend
ing that he is confused about his sex to gain access to vulnerable women
and children in public restrooms. . . .”37 Opposition by the organization
MassResistance focused similarly on objections to bathroom usage but
characterized the impact of the law in even more extreme ways. Accord
ing to a report the organization prepared in opposition to the bill, “[t]here
will also be demands for gender-neutral single-person restrooms in all
publicly accessible places, already the rage at colleges across the coun
try—a very expensive add-on.”38 Opponents of transgender equality

33. Legislative Brief, Mass. Family Inst., Yes, HB 1728 is a Bathroom Bill (2008),
http://www.nobathroombill.com/resources/mfilegislatorbrief02.htm.
34. No Bathroom Bill, NoBathroomBill.com Ad #1, YOUTUBE (MAR. 17, 2009), http://www.yo
utube.com/watch?v=GWDA4IGyY-s.
35. Frequently Asked Questions, NO BATHROOM BILL http://www.nobathroombill.com/
faqs.htm (last visited March 3, 2010).
36. Deborah Furtado, Remarks at the Press Conference at Great Hall, State House, Boston,
Mass. (April 8, 2009), http://www.nobathroombill.com/resources/furtadoremarks.htm.
37. Kris Mineau, President, Mass. Family Inst., Testimony Before the Judiciary Committee in
Opposition to HB 1728 (July 14, 2009),
http://www.nobathroombill.com/judiciaryhearing.htm#mineau (last visited July 4, 2010).
38. Contrada, supra note 32.
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have used similar arguments across the country to fight bills in Maryland,39 Colorado,40 Michigan,41 and Florida.42
Bathroom-centered objections to transgender rights have appeared
at the federal level as well. In response to the news that President Ob
ama had come out in favor of a transgender-inclusive Employment Non
discrimination Act, right-wing religious organization Americans for
Truth About Homosexuality, brainchild of long-time right-wing activist
Peter LaBarbera, released a press statement asking, “So will an Obama
Administration allow these big-boned men in female clothing to use la
dies’ restrooms in federal buildings? What will a President Obama do to
protect the right to privacy of female federal workers who don’t want
men wearing dresses—with male genitalia—sharing their women’s restroom?”43
What is clear from all of these examples is that opponents use a
predictable set of themes to argue broadly against transgender equality as
much as to focus on any real concerns about bathroom access or privacy.
As we discuss below, the same themes appear not only in the bathroom
discrimination case law, but also in the cross-dressing cases.
III. BATHROOM DISCRIMINATION: ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW
A small handful of published cases discuss the rights of transgender
people to access the appropriate bathroom. Just as in the cross-dressing
cases analyzed in the next section, the tropes are easily categorized. The
courts and defendants justify denying transgender people access to a
39. Montgomery County, Md., Bill 23-07, Maryland Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Law
(Nov 13, 2007) (enacted); H.B. 474/S.B. 566 Human Relations—Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity—Antidiscrimination, HB 474/SB 566, 426th Sess. (Md. 2009).
40. S.B. 08-200, 2008 Leg., (Co. 2008) (enacted). Focus on the Family targeted Colorado’s
gender identity bill, declaring in a flier that “Colorado Just Opened its Public Bathrooms to Either
Sex!” accompanied by a picture of a scared young girl cowering in a bathroom stall with a large man
nearby. FOCUS ON THE FAMILY ACTION, LEAFLET, COLORADO JUST OPENED ITS PUBLIC
BATHROOMS TO EITHER SEX! (undated) (on file with author).
41. Kalamazoo, Mich., Ordinance 1856, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimi
nation Law (Nov. 3, 2009). The organization Kalamazoo Citizens Voting No to Special Rights sent
out a mailer stating: “[O]ne could declare himself to be of the opposite sex and use facilities like
restrooms, locker rooms, and showers . . . . ‘Gender Identity’ makes it legal for anyone to declare
himself to be any sex he chooses at any time.” KALAMAZOO CITIZENS VOTING NO TO SPECIAL
RIGHTS, MAILER, IS THERE A MAN IN YOUR DAUGHTER’S BATHROOM? (2009) (on file with author).
42. Gainesville, Fla., Ordinance 051225, Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Law (Jan. 28,
2008). See also, Citizens for Good Public Policy, Citizens for Good Public Policy—Commercial,
YOUTUBE (June 17, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExGBlXKRrYs (last visited July 4,
2010).
43. Press Release, Americans for Truth About Homosexuality, Will Federal Female Employees
Be Safe from Cross-Dressing Men Using Ladies’ Restrooms in the Obama Administration? (Nov.
10,
2008), http://americansfortruth.com/news/will-federal-female-employees-be-safe-from-cross
dressing-men-using-ladies%E2%80%99-restrooms-in-the-obama-administration.html.
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bathroom consistent with their gender identity, even in states where such
discrimination is expressly prohibited, by (1) some generalized fear of
crime; (2) the need to prevent gender “fraud,” (3) heteronormativity; and
(4) a social need to enforce sex stereotypes.
Most importantly, in every case denying a transgender person’s
right to access the bathroom consistent with the person’s gender identity,
the logic of discrimination easily extends to other legal protections for
transgender people and threatens to undermine the purpose of the laws.
We discussed above how nondiscriminatory bathroom access is a fun
damental health need. Here, we show how it is also a crucial legal right
and that those who seek to deny it also seek to deny transgender people
equality in a range of contexts, including employment.
A. Preventing Fraud and Crime
Concerns over the possibility of fraud and crime are framed in a va
riety of ways by defendants in the bathroom cases. Whether as a matter
of safety or privacy, the underlying message emerging from these cases
is that transgender people are perceived to be sexually threatening. In
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the defendant argued, “Women have
legitimate concerns about privacy and safety underlying their desire not
to share restrooms, showers or dressing rooms with men, which are not
motivated by animus against men and which do not result in societal dis
advantage to men.”44 The defendant, a public-transportation provider in
Utah, also argued that allowing the plaintiff to use the women’s restroom
would interfere with its ability “to maintain an image of professionalism
and of a safe environment for [its] customers.”45 The defendant stated
that it had a “legitimate reason to be concerned that women may be up
set, offended, embarrassed or frightened by a biological male with male
genitalia using the same women’s restroom,” ignoring the fact that the
plaintiff, a transit worker, presented as female.46 In another case, Som
mers v. Budget Marketing, the court stated that while “[w]e are not un
mindful of the problem [the plaintiff] faces[,] . . . [the defendant] faces a
problem in protecting the privacy interests of its female employees.”47
Even in the absence of evidence to support the argument, the court held
for the defendant.
A more interesting argument is that allowing a transgender person
to use the right bathroom could incite others to violence. This echoes the
44. Brief of Appellees Utah Transit Authority and Betty Shirley at 32, Etsitty v. Utah Transit
Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-4193).
45. Id. at 27.
46. Id. at 31–32.
47. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th. Cir. 1982).
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mindset that queer people are to blame when they are attacked by others
out of panic and ignorance.48 In Cruzan v. Minnesota Public School Sys
tem, the court held that a school district had not violated a non
transgender female teacher’s rights by allowing a transgender female to
use the bathroom.49 The defendants in Etsitty distinguished their situa
tion from that faced by the complainants in Cruzan by arguing that they
were “concerned about members of the general public over whom it has
no control, as opposed to coworkers such as Ms. Cruzan, who can be
trained and informed.”50 In a Maine case, the defendant made a similar
argument, stating that “letting complainant use the female restroom
would potentially cause an altercation and involve police.”51 Of course,
the defendants ignored the very real safety risks involved in forcing a
female-identified person to use the men’s room and had no data upon
which to rely to advance their arguments.
B. Enforcing Gender Norms, Discouraging Homosexuality
The importance of maintaining gender and sexuality norms also
looms over many of the bathroom decisions. Several courts treat bath
room access for transgender people as a bridge too far, after which all
reasonable gender-based restrictions would fall. In Etsitty, a transgender
employee of the Utah Transportation Authority brought federal discrimi
nation claims against her employer for unlawful termination. The defen
dants admitted that “at the time of the termination, [the Utah Transporta
tion Authority] had received no complaints about Ms. Etsitty’s perfor
mance, appearance, or restroom usage,” yet they fired her in anticipation
of such a reaction.52 The defendants argued that holding in favor of a
transgender person’s right to access the correct bathroom would be like
having “a federally protected right for male workers to wear nail polish
and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high heels, or for
female ditch diggers to strip to the waist in hot weather.”53
The result in Etsitty highlights the degree to which bathroom access
is central to transgender equality. Of course, some women, transgender
and non-transgender, do seek to wear dresses, nail polish, and high heels.
The defendants in Etsitty were not only arguing against transgender
48. See Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insuffi
cient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 133 (1992) (arguing that “judges should hold as a matter of
law that a homosexual advance is not sufficient provocation to incite a reasonable man to kill”).
49. Cruzan v. Minn. Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Minn. 2001).
50. Brief of Appellees, supra note 44, at 32.
51. ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, INVESTIGATOR’S REPORT, PA08-0212 3 (April 29, 2009)
(on file with author).
52. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
53. Brief of Appellees, supra note 44, at 32.
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people using the bathroom, but against any sort of protections for transgender women in the workplace. Moreover, the language of “mincing”
and speaking in a feminine way calls for employers to retain the right to
discipline and terminate non-masculine men, gay and non-gay. Not sur
prisingly, in Utah, the state in which this case was brought, gay men of
any gender expression are denied protections.
The Etsitty defendants also argued against the plaintiff’s claim that
termination based on bathroom access is unconstitutional sexstereotyping prohibited under the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.54
[I]f something as drastic as a biological man’s attempt to dress and
appear as a woman and use women’s restrooms is simply a failure
to conform to the male stereotype, and nothing more, then there is
no social custom or practice associated with a particular sex that is
not a stereotype. And if that is the case, then any male employee
could dress as a woman, use female restrooms, shower rooms and
locker rooms, and any attempt by the employer to prohibit such
conduct would constitute sex stereotyping in violation of Title
VII.55

The brief also argued that “[w]e live in a relatively conservative area and
I think there are expectations of the customer in how a [public transit]
employee is going to behave, and if a customer sees a bus operator enter
ing a female restroom one day and a male restroom another day, that can
be pretty disconcerting.”56 This argument, along with the bridge too far
doomsday predictions addressed above, precisely echo the Schlafly-style
hyperbole of ERA opposition.
Despite the contentions in the defendants’ briefs, several of the de
cisions dealing with bathroom discrimination fail to discuss the defen
dants’ reasoning for restricting transgender people’s access. It is treated
either as a point of common sense or a matter meriting no discussion. In
one case, the court noted, without commentary, that the plaintiff’s “mi
srepresentation led to a disruption of the company’s work routine in that
a number of female employees indicated they would quit if [the plaintiff]
were permitted to use the restroom facilities assigned to female person
nel.”57 Their motivation for quitting was not even addressed. In another
54. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In that case, “[t]he Court held that
evidence of sex stereotyping is ‘legal[ly] relevan[t]’ in the context of Title VII,” and that “[i]n the
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” Ilona Turner, Sex
Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561, 572 (2007).
55. Brief of Appellees, supra note 44, at 20.
56. Id. at 27.
57. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 748–49 (8th Cir. 1982).
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case, the court merely stated that defendants prohibited the transgender
plaintiff from using the bathroom, ignoring why they would take this
tack.58 The same occurred in an Ohio case, in which the plaintiff em
ployee who had presented as female for ten years was told to use the
men’s room because she had not changed the gender marker on her driv
er’s license, which required evidence of a course of surgery.59
C. Rationales for Denying Access Despite Transgender-Inclusive Nondi
scrimination Laws
The success of these common rationales for denying bathroombased discrimination cases is most disturbing, perhaps, in those states
with transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination laws. In those instances,
the same arguments—the dangerousness of transgender people and the
importance of preserving gender norms—figured prominently, notwith
standing the settled state policy reflected in the adoption of laws specifi
cally enumerating the characteristic of gender identity or gender expres
sion as protected.
The most notorious of these cases is Goins v. West Publishing, a
Minnesota Supreme Court decision. In 1997, Julie Goins began em
ployment with West Publishing in its Rochester, New York facility.60
Consistent with her female gender identity, Ms. Goins used the women’s
restroom at work without any problems from coworkers.61 It was not
until she transferred to West’s Minnesota facility later that year that she
began to have trouble. During a pre-relocation visit, several of Ms.
Goins’s soon-to-be coworkers complained to their supervisors about her
use of the women’s restroom.62 On the morning of her first day of work
at the Minnesota facility, the director of human resources informed Ms.
Goins that she could not use the women’s restroom facility.63 Ms. Goins
attempted to negotiate with the company over their newly articulated
policy that required restroom use according to what the company deter
mined to be a person’s “biological gender.” But after a short time and
being threatened with “disciplinary action if she continued to disregard
the restroom use policy,” Ms. Goins tendered her resignation, explaining
that the company policy was hostile to her and caused her undue stress.64

58. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 850 F. Supp. 284, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
59. Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 Fed. App’x 461, 461 (6th Cir. 2004).
60. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. 2001).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Despite being offered a promotion and substantial salary increase, she
left employment with West.
Ms. Goins filed an action against West alleging constructive termi
nation. She claimed both that the policy itself discriminated against her
impermissibly and that the conduct of West employees had created an
unlawful hostile work environment.65 Ms. Goins’s claim of discrimina
tion was grounded in Minnesota’s prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of “having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity
not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or female
ness.”66 Her claim was that the policy that required restroom use based
on “biological gender” was precisely the type of adverse treatment pro
scribed by the law. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with her
seemingly straightforward analysis, finding that Ms. Goins had stated a
prima facie case of direct evidence of discriminatory motive by showing
that West’s policy denied her the use of the female restroom facility
“based on the inconsistency between her self-image and her anatomy.”67
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, disagreed and granted
West’s motion for summary judgment.68 According to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, notwithstanding the language of the state law protecting
against adverse treatment based on the inconsistency of self-image and
maleness or femaleness, “where financially feasible, the traditional and
accepted practice in the employment setting is to provide restroom facili
ties that reflect the cultural preference for restroom designation based on
biological gender.”69 The court went on to explain that “absent more
express guidance from the legislature,” it would not undermine the em
ployer’s ability to create a workplace restroom policy that reflects what it
perceived as widely enforced cultural and social practices.70 In other
words, social norms trumped legislative language.
Notably, the court’s analysis regarding the relationship between so
cial norms and the legislative language cited only one case—one that
actually dismissed the hostile work environment claims brought by sev
eral teachers objecting to a transgender colleague’s use of the female re
stroom at a school.71 The court offered no other support in case law, le
65. Id.
66. Id. at 722 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)(2)(c) (2000)). Under Minnesota law, “sexual
orientation” is defined to include the more common categories of “gender identity and expression.”
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44) (2004).
67. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723.
68. Id. at 726.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 723.
71. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 31706 (Dep’t of Human Rights Aug. 26, 1999);
rev’d by Cruzan v. Minn. Public Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Minn. 2001) (granting defendant
school district’s motion for summary judgment, holding that female teacher had failed to establish
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gal doctrine, or even canons of construction for its analysis. Making the
analysis even more questionable is the fact that Minnesota’s nondiscri
mination law, well prior to including transgender people within its pur
view, had an express exclusion to the sex discrimination law for re
strooms.72 Apparently, the court simply ignored that exclusion and any
relevant legislative history and found it more appropriate to deny the
claim by imagining how a legislature that never was asked to address the
issue would have addressed it if asked.
In the same year as the Goins decision, however, a federal district
court in Cruzan v. Minnesota Public School System held as a matter of
Minnesota law that allowing a transgender person to use a genderconcordant bathroom did not create a hostile work environment for an
anti-transgender coworker.73 The American Center for Law and Justice,
a religious conservative public-interest law firm, brought the case on be
half of a public school teacher.74 The teacher argued that permitting a
transgender woman to use the women’s restroom violated her religious
freedom and created a hostile work environment.75 The court rejected
both of these claims, holding that “plaintiff fail[ed] to show that allowing
Davis to use the female faculty restroom has created a working condition
that rises to the level of an abusive environment. In fact, Cruzan ac
knowledges that she did not even notice Davis’s use of this restroom for
several months.”76 The federal court distinguished Cruzan from the facts
in Goins because “unlike the plaintiff in Goins, Cruzan [the non
transgender colleague who filed suit] has a choice of restrooms and is not
being denied access to any workplace facility on the basis of her gend
er.”77
Unfortunately, Cruzan has been the exception rather than the rule.
The effects of Goins have been felt beyond the borders of Minnesota.
New York purports to protect transgender people under both disability
and sex discrimination laws.78 Yet, despite that, in one New York case,
religious discrimination or hostile work environment due to school allowing male-to-female transgender teacher to use the women’s restroom).
72. MINN. STAT § 363A.24(1) (2004).
73. Cruzan, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 968–69.
74. Id. at 965. The American Center for Law and Justice website favorably cites a news report
declaring that it has “‘led the way’ in Christian legal advocacy.” Welcome from Jay Sekulow,
AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, http://www.aclj.org/About/ (last visited July 5, 2010).
75. Cruzan, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
76. Id. at 969.
77. Id.
78. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (2010). See Rentos v. OCE-Office Sys., 1996 WL 737215
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding transgender employee stated valid claim of sex discrimination under New
York State Human Rights Law); Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2003) (holding that “GID is a disa
bility [for purposes of] the State Human Rights Law” requiring reasonable accommodation).
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the court found the Goins ruling “instructive,” and held that “the defen
dants’ designation of restroom use, applied uniformly, on the basis of
‘biological gender,’ rather than biological self-image, was not discrimi
nation.”79 The court reasoned that “at this juncture, the only discernible
claim set forth in the complaint is that plaintiff’s transgender clients were
prohibited from using the restrooms not in conformance with their bio
logical sex, as were all tenants.”80 The defendants stated that they
“agree[d] that discrimination against transsexuals is abhorrent” but ar
gued that “this case is only about bathrooms and is a case that deals with
a situation which is dangerous to the public.”81 The defendants dis
missed the argument in favor of allowing transgender people equal bath
room access as an “absurdity,” saying that “there will be testimony [at
trial] indicating the use by anatomical male transsexuals of women’s
bathrooms, which were also being used by [five, six, and seven year-old
girls] at the same time.”82 The case ultimately settled out of court in
2005.83
In Maine, by way of contrast, the state human rights commission
has consistently rejected the Goins line of reasoning and protected the
rights of transgender people to access the bathroom. One case dealt with
the right to access a bathroom in a restaurant. The transgender complai
nant challenged respondent restaurant’s policy prohibiting her from using
the women’s restroom.84 The restaurant defendant proffered the familiar
litany of arguments, asserting that allowing a transgender woman to use
the restroom (1) invaded the “privacy” of biological women; (2) posed a
“danger [to] young girls and children using the women’s restroom” of
“being exposed to a man” because “there is a possibility of someone’s
child peeking into a stall”; (3) had possibility to “cause an altercation and
involve police”; and (4) opened “the door for a possible sex predator us
ing the bathroom of the opposite sex on purpose.”85 The restaurant’s
solution was for the transgender woman—who presented in a normative
ly feminine way—to use the men’s room. The commission rejected the
argument and held for complainant.86
79. Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
80. Id.
81. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d
43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (No. 3820).
82. Id. at 2.
83. See Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Bruno, ACLU, March 16, 2005, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt
rights_hiv-aids/hispanic-aids-forum-v-bruno.
84. See ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 51, at 3.
85. See ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 51, at 3.
86. See ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 51, at 3. The complainant in that case has
since filed a court action against the restaurant whose motion to dismiss the case was recently de
nied.
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The foregoing cases illustrate the power of the commonly-used ar
guments against transgender people’s nondiscriminatory access to re
strooms, even in states where gender expression is purportedly protected.
IV. CROSS-DRESSING LAWS: ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY AND CASE
LAW
The same types of arguments used in bathroom access cases—
preventing crime and fraud, discouraging homosexuality, and enforcing
gender norms—were also all significant in the history and case law sur
rounding the issue of cross-dressing. Unlike the bathroom cases, howev
er, the courts almost uniformly struck down the cross-dressing bans and
in no instance sustained their use against a transgender defendant. Their
reasoning offers another set of arguments against bathroom discrimina
tion, as we discuss in the final section of this Article.
A. History of Cross-Dressing Laws
Sumptuary codes regulating dress based on sex, class, religion, and
race date back to the Middle Ages. As discussed by I. Bennett Capers in
his article Cross-Dressing and the Criminal, “many of these laws served
to inscribe and police social boundaries.”87 In Elizabethan England, the
Queen “issued more royal brevets concerning dress than any prior mo
narch.” A royal proclamation in 1597 contained “dress prohibitions,
from materials for headdresses, netherstocks, jerkins, hose, and doublets,
depending on whether one was an earl or count or gentleman or had an
annual income of 500 marks or more, or fell in some station in be
tween.”88
Sumptuary laws also played a role in marking racial and religious
groups.
A 1430 Venetian order, for example, mandated that all Jews identi
fy themselves as Jewish by wearing on their chests yellow circles of
cord; Rome required that male Jews wear red tabards and female
Jews red overskirts. In [the U.S.], sumptuary laws limited the type
of clothing that could be worn by black slaves. South Carolina’s
slave code, for example, mandated that slaves could only wear ne
gro cloth, duffelds, coarse kearsies, osnabrigs, blue linen, checked
linen or coarse garlix or calicoes, checked cottons, or scotch plaids,
not exceeding ten shillings per yard for the said checked cottons,
scotch plaids, garlix or calico.89

87. I. Bennett Capers, Cross-Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 7 (2008).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 8.
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The first American cross-dressing laws, however, arose
[b]etween 1850 and 1870, just as the abolitionist movement, then
the Civil War, and then Reconstruction were disrupting the subordi
nate/superordinate balance between blacks and whites, just as mid
dle class white women were demanding social and economic equali
ty, agitating for the right to vote, and quite literally asserting their
right to wear pants, and just as lesbian and gay subcultures were
emerging in large cities, jurisdictions began passing sumptuary leg
islation which had the effect of reifying sex and gender distinc
tions.90

Twenty-eight cities passed cross-dressing laws in the nineteenth
century and an additional twelve passed laws in the twentieth century,
with the most recent passed by Cincinnati in 1974.91 In the nineteenth
century, this “wave of local legislation . . . represented a new develop
ment,” according to historian Susan Stryker.92 “Cities of every size and
in every part of the country adopted gender-normative sumptuary
rules.”93 And into the 1970s and 1980s, they were routinely enforced.
The city of Houston’s cross-dressing law, for instance, resulted in the
arrests of fifty-three people in 1977.94
Though these laws were ultimately used to punish people for their
gender expression, in many states this was not the legislative intent. In
People v. Archibald, the dissenting judge identified the anti-criminality
roots of the 1845 New York cross-dressing law. “[T]he original sec
tion,” he pointed out, “was enacted as part of an over-all policy aimed at
ending the anti-rent riots, an armed insurrection by farmers in the Hud
son Valley.” The farmers,
while disguised as “Indians,” murdered law enforcement officers at
tempting to serve writs upon the farmers . . . . [A]s part of their cos
tumes, [they] wore women’s calico dresses to further conceal their
identities . . . . Indeed, males dressed in female attire for purposes
other than discussed above were not even considered by the Legis
lature adopting the section.95
90. Id. See also SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 31 (2008). See also Michelle Mig
dal Gee, Annotation, Validity of Law Criminalizing Wearing Dress of Opposite Sex, 12 A.L.R. FED.
1249 (1982) for a summary of relevant cases.
91. For table, see STRYKER, supra note 90, at 32–33 (citing Clare Sears, A Dress Not Belong
ing to His or Her Sex: Cross-Dressing Law in San Francisco, 1860–1900, (2005) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Sociology Department, Univ. of Cal.—Santa Cruz) (on file with author) (based on data
from WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1997)).
92. STRYKER, supra note 90, at 33.
93. ESKRIDGE, supra note 91, at 27.
94. Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
95. People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. App. Term 1968).
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In other states, however, gender norms did motivate the passage of
these laws. First, as women entered the public square, demands for more
comfortable and less restrictive women’s clothing arose. “Nineteenth
century antifeminist opinion, which saw in feminism a threatened loss of
distinction between men and women, considered dress reform to be tan
tamount to cross-dressing,” echoing the opposition of Phylis Schlafly and
her cohorts a century later.96
The desire to keep women “in their place” and prevent them from
assuming the privileges and status of men stemmed from the archaic
sumptuary laws that regulated dress in Europe and pre-Revolutionary
America. These laws “were designed to regulate dress in order to mark
out as visible and above all legible distinctions of wealth and rank within
a society undergoing changes that threatened to blur or even obliterate
such distinctions.”97 Since colonial times, laws barred people from wear
ing clothes signifying certain professions or social classes and barred
people from attempting to present themselves as a different race.98
Second, cities passed cross-dressing laws to deal with the post-war
stirrings of gay liberation. In Chicago, they termed it “sexual deviance”;
it was called “illegal deception” in California and New York.99 In Chi
cago, the law was part of a broader legal effort to “urg[e] proper sex
roles by proscribing dress, reading material, and behavior . . . as part of a
general rule against public lewdness and indecency,” that is, to regulate
homosexuality.100 There was a widespread perception among gay men
and lesbians that they needed to avoid any sort of cross-dressing in order
to steer clear of violating the law for wearing too few gender-appropriate
garments.101 One author writes that there was an “understanding among
gay men and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s that they were subject to
arrest unless they had on three garments appropriate to their gender.”102
The cross-dressing laws, even when they were not borne out of the desire
to enforce gender norms, functioned to keep gays and lesbians in fear of
not conforming.
96. STRYKER, supra note 90, at 35.
97. Jessica A. Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory, Conventional Practice,
84 OR. L. REV. 563, 597 (2005) (citations omitted).
98. STRYKER, supra note 90, at 35.
99. ESKRIDGE, supra note 91, at 27.
100. Id. at 28. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., CHICAGO MUN. CODE §192-8 (prohibits a person from
wearing clothing of the opposite sex with the intent to conceal his or her sex); COLUMBUS, OHIO,
COLUMBUS MUN. CODE §2343.04 (prohibiting person from appearing in public “in a dress not be
longing to his or her sex”). See also People v. Simmons, 357 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1974) (“Cross-dressing is proscribed by the laws of several states and municipalities.”).
101. Clarke, supra note 97, at 593–94 (citing Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1551 n.85 (1993)).
102. Id. at 594.
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B. Cross-Dressing Case Law
As the courts began to strike down the cross-dressing laws as un
constitutional, they rejected the four justifications—to be later echoed in
the bathroom cases—put forward by the laws’ defenders: (1) concerns
about fraud; (2) crime detection; (3) discouragement of overt homosex
uality; and (4) maintaining widely held social norms of appropriate gen
dered expression. Not all of these arguments appear in each case, but
these four categories neatly encapsulate the varieties of rhetoric em
ployed by anti-transgender lawyers and activists.
1. Preventing Fraud and Crime
Defenders of cross-dressing laws argued that the cross-dressing
laws were needed to “protect citizens from being misled or defrauded,”
“to aid in the description and detection of criminals,” and “to prevent
crimes in washrooms.”103 In an unpublished case brought in Fort Worth,
Texas, the court held, in contrast, that a cross-dressing “ordinance [was]
invalid unless the impersonation is done for fraud.”104 The court refused
to see in cross-dressing an implied fraud, as the law’s defenders urged.105
In that instance, police visited a local gay bar “on a routine check” and
arrested seven of its biologically male patrons for wearing evening
gowns.106 They were charged, according to a contemporary news ac
count, “with impersonating females under a city ordinance that makes it
illegal for a man to wear clothing ‘not appropriate to his sex.’”107 The
judge remarked that since he usually dismisses such cases, he couldn’t
understand why the police continue[d] to use the ordinance to harass
people.”108
Another court held that the “preventing crime” justification was
constitutionally permissible, yet held that the ordinance was unconstitu
tional as applied to a transgender person, acknowledging that gender
identity was central to the person’s public and private sense of self, re

103. Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 532 (Ill. 1978). In Wilson, “the defendants testified
that they were transsexuals, and were, at the time of their arrests, undergoing psychiatric therapy in
preparation for a sex reassignment operation. As part of this therapy, both defendants stated, they
were required to wear female clothing and to adopt a female life-style. Kimberley stated that he had
explained this to the police at the time of his arrest. Both defendants said they had been transsexuals
all of their lives and thought of themselves as females.” Id. at 523. See also Doe v. McConn, 489 F.
Supp. 76, 80 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
104. Fort Worth Judge Raps Drag Arrests, ADVOCATE, Dec. 19, 1973, at 14.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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gardless of anatomy or physiology.109 In that case, the court held “com
mon sense and experience discloses that this ordinance has a real and
substantial relation to the public safety and general welfare. There are
numerous subjects who would want to change their sex identity in order
to perpetrate crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, assault, etc.”110 The
court cited no studies, case law, or other authority for this assertion.
Notably, however, no fraud concern could support the law’s application
to a transgender person whose dress and appearance reflected her female
gender identity.111
2. Enforcing Gender Norms
Other proponents of the cross-dressing prohibitions argued that en
forcing gender norms was necessary to protect the public peace. In a
transphobic iteration of the “she was asking for it” argument, lawyers
argued in Mayes v. Texas that “[a]n ineffective [cross-gender] disguise
may engender cat-calls and slurring remarks leading to a breach of the
peace. An efficient disguise could lead to trouble after an acquaintance is
formed with the disguise and the true sex is disclosed when the friend
ship becomes amorous.”112 In another case, the city’s attorneys de
scribed the enforcement of gender norms as an effort “to prevent inhe
rently antisocial conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of our
society.” This likely refers to the discouragement of homosexuality and
demonstrates how, even before the emergence of an explicitly “LGBT”
community, our opponents thought of us as one entity.113
In another case, even as it dismissed the charge against the defen
dant, the court discussed the validity of cross-dressing laws for enforcing
gender norms. In People v. Simmons,114 the defendant was arrested after
being reported by the complainant, who believed the defendant to be a
female prostitute.115 The court’s description of the facts of the case re
veals that the defendant offered “to take care” of the complainant for
$10.116 In response, the complainant invited the defendant into his car
and drove to a nearby dead-end street.117 It is not clear what transpired
109. Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602, 604–06 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1970).
110. Id. at 604.
111. Id.
112. Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 4, Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (No. 73
627).
113. Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 532 (Ill. 1978); see also Doe v. McConn, 489 F.
Supp. 76, 80 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
114. People v. Simmons, 357 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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between the defendant and the complainant, but the court’s description
states that at some point the complainant flagged down a police car and
accused the defendant of stealing money from him while the two of them
were in the car.118 In response, the police arrested Simmons, who was
charged with larceny, prostitution, and “criminal impersonation.”119
The focus of the court’s analysis was on the legitimacy of Sim
mons’s gender expression. The opening three sentences of the opinion
were, “The defendant is a male. When arrested he wore a woman’s wig,
dress, makeup and shoes. Following arrest he was searched, and his true
sex was discovered.”120 Ultimately, the court dismissed the charge of
criminal impersonation because it required proof that the person charged
was impersonating “another,” and in this case, no such impersonation
could be shown.121
Not content to simply dismiss the criminal impersonation charge,
the court opined at length about the significance and vibrancy of crossdressing prohibitions. The court cited Deuteronomy 22:5, “The woman
shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put
on a woman’s garment: for all that do so are abomination unto the Lord,
thy God,” to support, in part, its conclusion that cross-dressing prohibi
tions broadly exist and reflect societal norms.122 The court went even
further to search for solutions in anthropology or biology for the deep
commitment to social norms: “The anthropologists can perhaps explain
whether this intolerance of cross-dressing characterizes other societies.
Biologists may theorize that in the lower animal species, inability of the
male and female of the species to recognize each other’s differences may
lead to frustration of the reproductive urge.”123 Regardless of the source,
the court concluded that cross-dressing prohibitions existed broadly
across the country, sometimes focusing on “transvestism” and other
times focusing on “concealment of identity.”124 Either way, the court
concluded, consistent with the other cases, that the state has the authority
to prohibit cross-dressing.125
In another case, the arrest seemed based on the police officer’s per
sonal offense at being confronted by a cross-dressing person.126 In Arc
hibald, the defendant was arrested and charged with the offense of va
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 364.
122. Id. at 365.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 862–63 (N.Y. App. Term 1968).
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grancy, a code subsection apparently titled “impersonating a female.”127
According to the majority opinion, the arresting officer reported that he
had observed a group of three people engaged in loud conversation at
four in the morning on a subway station platform.128 One of the individ
uals, who was “wearing a white evening dress, high heel shoes, blonde
wig, female undergarments,129 and facial makeup,”130 had the misjudg
ment to wink at the officer and walk away from him.131 After the wink
ing incident, the officer asked the defendant whether he was a boy or
girl, and when the individual responded, “I am a girl,”132 the officer ar
rested him. The court sustained the arrest.133
From the majority opinion, one can discern no context for the un
derlying conduct and might even suppose, from a contemporary perspec
tive, the legitimacy of the appearance based on the defendant having a
female identity.134 It is only the dissenting justice who points out that the
defendant had been at a masquerade party that night and was on his way
home when the interaction with law enforcement occurred. Unlike the
majority, the dissent found the local law that apparently criminalized ap
pearing in public (and winking at a police officer) to be “an invalid exer
cise of the State’s police power.”135
3. Discouraging Homosexuality
Others argued that the prevention of homosexuality was the core is
sue of public policy at stake in banning cross-dressing. The City of Hou
ston’s lawyers articulated this stance in their briefs urging the Supreme
Court to deny certiorari in Mayes v. Texas, a case challenging the city’s
cross-dressing law.136 The lawyers argued that
[s]ociety is presently thought to have an interest in barring homo
sexual acts since homosexuality is, at least partially, an acquired or
taught trait. Our society deems it important not to have its youth
learning to be homosexual rather than heterosexual. This interest is

127. Id. at 862.
128. Id.
129. It is completely unclear from the opinion how the officer knew of this fact.
130. Id. at 863.
131. Id. at 862.
132. Id. at 863.
133. Id.
134. The majority opinion suggests nothing dishonest about the defendant’s response, “I am a
girl,” to the officer’s question about gender.
135. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (Markowitz, J., dissenting).
136. Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (denying certiorari).
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in part rooted in the survival of the race; procreation is necessary to
ensure the continuation of the human race.137

Because “dressing or disguising as a member of the opposite sex is a step
toward creating homosexual relationships” it can be “proscribed in the
same manner as more overt homosexual conduct.”138
In Archibald, the dissent, which opposed application of a crossdressing law to a non-transgender biological man who was merely
dressed as a woman for a masquerade party, asserted that it was “within
the province of legislative controls” to discourage “overt homosexuality
in public places which is offensive to public morality.”139
V. THE CROSS-DRESSING CASE FOR BATHROOM EQUALITY
The cross-dressing cases highlight the origins of the arguments that
still dominate public conversation and misunderstanding of transgender
issues. The same justifications are still used by anti-transgender activists
to fight against nondiscrimination laws and transgender-inclusive bath
room policies: enforcement of gender norms, discouraging overt homo
sexuality, and prevention of fraud and crime. In this section, we com
pare the cross-dressing and bathroom cases to show how the logic under
pinning both types of discriminatory laws lacks a legal basis.
A. Preventing Fraud and Crime: A Tussman & tenBroek Analysis
The fraud and crime fear looms large to this day, as evidenced by
the public campaigns of anti-transgender activists across the country.
The public hearings for the Massachusetts gender identity nondiscrimina
tion law (like those for similar laws in other states) provide clear proof
that the same beliefs and fears that animated the cross-dressing laws con
tinue to fuel anti-transgender activism. But in both the cross-dressing
and bathroom contexts, these crime-prevention arguments fall flat. The
simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive nature of the bathroom
and cross-dressing prohibitions renders both of them constitutionally
questionable. This is highlighted by the classic equal protection analysis
advanced by Professors Tussman and tenBroek in their article, The Equal
Protection of the Laws.140
137. Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 3, Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (No. 73
627).
138. Id. at 3–4.
139. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.D.2d at 838 (Markowitz, J. dissenting).
140. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341 (1949). According to one professor’s calculations, this article is the fourteenth most-cited law
review article in the entire body of legal literature. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 (1996).
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The professors argued that
[t]he Constitution does not require that things different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. But it does require, in
its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be si
milarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a classifica
tion is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly
situated.141

Thus, “[a] reasonable classification is one which includes all persons
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”142 As
a result, “[i]t is impossible to pass judgment on the reasonableness of a
classification without taking into consideration, or identifying, the pur
pose of the law.”143
The professors reject the argument that a law is constitutionally
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause merely because it treats all
people targeted by the law in the same way. In fact, there are two cate
gories to examine. “The first class consists of all individuals possessing
the defining Trait (T)” targeted by the legislation. “The second class
consists of all individuals possessing, or rather, tainted by, the Mischief
(M) at which the law aims,” that is, all those “similarly situated with re
spect to the purpose of the law.”144
In their wide-ranging analysis, the professors analyze those laws
that manage to be simultaneously “underinclusive” and “overinclusive.”
Both the cross-dressing and bathroom cases fit this category. In both, the
aim of the legislation or police action is to prevent crimes or fraud by
those using a disguise to evade police detection. This legislation tar
gets—and, indeed, ends up focusing almost exclusively on—transgender
people.
As for preventing disguises meant to confuse police, the law is un
derinclusive insofar as it fails to include every type of disguise that could
fool police into thinking a person is an innocent passerby (e.g., dressing
up as a nurse, an Amish person, a tourist, or any other stereotypical cate
gory of people not generally thought to have criminal intentions). The
professors concede that underinclusive laws should usually be upheld,
nonetheless, because of the “administrative” difficulties of achieving
complete comprehensiveness and the traditionally “piecemeal” approach
that legislators often take to solve problems.145

141. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 140, at 344.
142. Id. at 346.
143. Id. at 347.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 349.
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When an underinclusive statute has a discriminatory motive, how
ever, it should not be upheld. In our situation, the animus towards gend
er non-conforming people is clear. This is an impermissible motivation.
As Tussman and tenBroek point out,
when a classification is under-inclusive, the Court must satisfy itself
that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with
equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched. It is
relevant to inquire, in this connection, whether the failure to extend
the law to others similarly situated is due to the presence of forbid
den legislative motive.146

If police confusion is such a problem, why is gender the only category
that these laws address?
The laws, however, are also overbroad in that they are directed at a
group that does not meet the legislative purpose at all. It is a fallacy to
include among the maliciously-disguised those people for whom their
gender expression is not a disguise at all, but how they live their daily
life and understand their deepest sense of self. It is “perfectly unreason
able” in the professors’ view to pass a law where “no member of the
class defined in the law is tainted with the mischief at which the law
aims.”147 It is no more a disguise for a transgender person to dress in
accordance with his or her gender identity than it is for a near-sighted
person to wear glasses or a person with big feet to wear large shoes.
Even granting, for argument’s sake, that transgender people are in
“disguise,” which itself betrays a deep ignorance of transgender people’s
lives and experiences, the laws are still impermissibly overinclusive be
cause there is no significant risk of crime.148 “Even in San Francisco (the
U.S. city most likely to have the highest percentage of transgender wom
en per capita), there has never been a single police report of a transgend
er woman harassing another woman in a bathroom.”149 In Tussman and
tenBroek’s view, overinclusive legislation of the sort that sweeps up
huge numbers of innocents among the guilty is only appropriate in an
emergency context, such as a war or disease outbreak, or when the “im
146. Id. at 360 (citing Mo., K & T Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 269 (1903)).
147. Id. at 348.
148. In a case stemming indirectly from the June 3, 1972 arrests of three female impersonators
performing at a Miami Beach nightclub, Judge Mehrtens held that the law “violates the equal protec
tion clause of the 14th amendment because it virtually and arbitrarily prohibits men from wearing
clothing inappropriate to their sex but does not prohibit women from wearing clothing inappropriate
to their sex. . . .” Unconstitutional: Court Voids Miami Beach Drag Bans, ADVOCATE, July 19,
1972, at 4.
149. JULIA SERANO, WHIPPING GIRL: A TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE
SCAPEGOATING OF FEMININITY 242 (2007) (citing Tali Woodward, Transjobless, S.F. BAY
GUARDIAN, March 15, 2006).
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positions are relatively mild,” such as with a road block.150 As we dis
cussed above, this imposition is far from mild on transgender people,
often leading to health problems, grievous harassment, and employment
discrimination. And no advocate of bathroom discrimination has ever
presented one iota of evidence that transgender people pose more of a
“danger” than any other group.
In addition, an argument used in a cross-dressing case that applies
equally to the bathroom context is that there are laws on the books to
punish any of the feared crimes a person could commit in the bathroom.
“Particularly apparent is the fact that absent this ordinance the conduct of
a [transgender person] remains subject to statutes or ordinances prohibit
ing soliciting, importuning, pandering obscenity, public indecency, tres
passing, or soliciting rides or hitchhiking.”151 The denial of bathroom
access is not only offensive and unfair, but also unjustifiable.
In the one cross-dressing case that does deal with an act of crimi
nality, the defendant argued that she had a female gender identity, and
thus, the law punishing disguises did not apply. In that case, two geneti
cally male defendants dressed as women in order to convince a man that
they were female prostitutes and that he should let them in the car.152
Once in the car, they robbed him. The defendant appealed the court’s
application of a law that provided for enhanced penalties for “wearing a
hood, mask, or other device that concealed his identity” while commit
ting the crime.153 The defendant argued against application of the en
hancement because the defendant was, in fact, female-identified. The
defendant pointed to “evidence at trial that the police knew him as a man
who dresses as a woman . . . [and] contend[ed] his true identity is that of
a woman.”154
The court upheld the trial court’s application of the law because, in
their eyes, the defendant had offered insufficient evidence to show that
this was not a disguise and because, unlike cases holding cross-dressing
prohibitions unconstitutional, this was a prohibition “associated with
criminal conduct and . . . public health, safety, morals and welfare.”155
The dissent argued that “[t]he days when a person’s gender can be readi
ly ascertained by the attire worn have passed,” and that the language of
the statute indicated an intent to prohibit “conceal[ing]” and not “dis
guis[ing] or alter[ing]” appearance.156 Of course, there is no dispute that
150. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 140, at 352.
151. Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
152. Fletcher v. State, 472 So.2d 537, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
153. Id. at 539 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.0845 (2009)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 540.
156. Id. (Dauksch dissenting).
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if the defendant had been found to be wearing women’s clothes because
the defendant identified as female, the applicable robbery or theft statute
would have remained to convict the defendant of the crimes alleged. In
Tussman and tenBroek’s analysis, the prohibition on gender-based “dis
guises” would likely fail because of the overwhelming likelihood, borne
out by the evidence, that it would be used to target transgender people
exclusively.
A court applied reasoning similar to that used by Tussman and tenBroek in a recent Arizona case. The court in Kastl v. Maricopa County
Community College District addressed the equal protection problems
raised by denying transgender people access to appropriate bathrooms
and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss a transgender plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim based on bathroom discrimination.157 This case is distin
guishable from many that we have discussed because the plaintiff ar
gued, using medical proof, that she was indeed genotypically female
even though she possessed male genitals.158 Nevertheless, the court’s
reasoning for finding the defendant’s policies unconstitutional applies to
all transgender people.
Although the Court agrees that Defendant possesses a legitimate in
terest in protecting the privacy and safety of its patrons . . . the
Court fails to see, and Defendant fails to indicate, how the imple
mentation of that policy in a manner which singles out nonconform
ing individuals, including transsexuals, for a greater intrusion upon
their privacy is rationally related to such an interest.159

The court continued, “Though government action may be upheld if
its connection to a legitimate interest is tenuous or the action is unwise,
where ‘the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of
the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.’”160
The plaintiff highlighted the discriminatory nature of the defen
dant’s bathroom policy requiring proof of male genitals to use the men’s
room. First, only she and another transgender person were required to
provide this proof. Second, the defendant refused to acknowledge her
state-issued identification (that had a female gender marker). The court
was unsympathetic to the defendant.
Contrary to Defendant’s suggestion that the justification for the pol
icy is “readily apparent,” the only justification of which the Court

157. Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531, 2004 WL 2008954,
at *7, *10, (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004).
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id. at *8.
160. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996)).
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can conceive is one predicated on one or more of the following
baseless assumptions: 1) transsexuals pose a greater risk to minors’
and others’ safety than any other group; 2) a biological woman can
never have lived or presented herself as a man; and 3) the presence
of a biological woman with male genitalia invades the privacy
and/or threatens the safety of other women.161

The court rejected all of these rationales and held the defendant’s policy
to be unconstitutional.
Besides being justified by this reasoning, Tussman and tenBroek’s
analysis has garnered support in the cross-dressing cases, and even—in
the case of Kastl—a bathroom case. This well-established framework
aptly defeats the criminal and fraud concerns surrounding barring transgender people from appropriate bathrooms.
B. Discouraging Homosexuality: An Unconstitutional Purpose
The opposition to overt homosexuality in cross-dressing cases also
echoes contemporary objections. In both contexts, these arguments lack
a legal basis. The privacy objection to transgender-inclusive laws is
rooted in the idea that restricting restroom use to persons of the same sex
guarantees privacy from the sexual (or otherwise “improper”) gaze of
others. In other words, the presumption that a woman’s privacy is guar
anteed by excluding men from a particular space rests on the presump
tion that only men would be interested in intruding on that privacy. The
presumption says both too much and too little in presuming all men
would violate a woman’s privacy and that no women would. Neither is,
of course, true. It also ignores the analytical divide that exists between
gender identity and sexual orientation. Many transgender people are also
gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Similar to the bathroom cases, the subtext of
the cross-dressing cases is that transgender people are predators not to be
trusted, especially in a bathroom setting involving nudity and private
acts.
Of course, the same arguments have long motivated laws discrimi
nating against gay and lesbian people. In 1978, State Senator John
Briggs pushed for a ballot initiative that would have fired all gay and
lesbian schoolteachers in California. At one event supporting the meas
ure, Briggs argued that “[h]omosexuals want your children . . . . They
don’t have any children of their own . . . . That’s why they want to be
teachers and be equal status and have those people serve as role models

161. Id.
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and encourage to join them.”162 The same vaguely predatory notions
animated the Boy Scouts’ argument for excluding homosexuals in the
infamous Boy Scouts of America v. Dale case. In that case, Boy Scouts
argued that gay people are inappropriate for leadership positions that in
volve “many overnight camping trips . . . a week together in summer
camp, [and] . . . a far greater degree of intimacy among members than
would be the case in a group that met only for formal meet
ings . . . .” The court continued, “When an 11 year-old boy away from
home for the first time becomes afraid at night, skins his knee, or forgets
his sleeping bag, he looks to his Scoutmaster for support.”163
The ongoing debate over Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) also cen
ters on fears of the predatory homosexual. In 2008, at the first hearing
on DADT since its passage, Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for
Military Readiness, warned of “transgenders in the military,” “forcible
sodomy,” and spreading “HIV positivity” through the ranks.164 Senator
Saxby Chambliss of Georgia commented at a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing in 2010 that repealing Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would
lead to “alcohol use, adultery, fraternization, and body art.”165
While Dale and Don’t Ask Don’t Tell remain the law of the land,
the anti-gay sentiment at the heart of both cannot be questioned. Just as
DADT is rejected by much of the country,166 the view of transgender
people as predators is similarly doomed to fade away.
C. Maintaining Traditional Gender Norms
In both the cross-dressing and bathroom contexts, the social normsbased argument that anatomy is determinative of a person’s sex and,
therefore, should dictate which restroom a person uses remains strong.
Analysis of the cross-dressing cases reveals that fear of changing social
norms was at the heart of the enforcement of such laws even while courts
and society were acknowledging their diminishing legitimacy. Overall,
the justifications closely mirror the safety and privacy objections raised
in opposition to gender identity nondiscrimination laws protecting bath
162. RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY MILK
230 (1978).
163. Brief of Petitioners at 41, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99
699) (citations omitted).
164. Dana Milbank, Sorry We Asked, Sorry You Told, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 24, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/23/AR2008072303642.html.
165. Jillian Rayfield, Chambliss: Repealing DADT Would Open Door to ‘Adultery’ and ‘Body
Art’ in the Military, TPM, Feb. 2, 2010, http://tpmlivewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/02/sen
chambliss-repealing-dadt-opens-the-door-for-adultery-and-body-art-in-the-military.php.
166. Quinnipiac University, U.S. Voters Say Gays in Military Should Come Out, Quinni
piac University National Poll Finds, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1295.xml?ReleaseI
D=1422.
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room access. The diminishment of societal fears associated with the en
forcement of cross-dressing laws presages the diminishment of related
fears associated with objections to modern laws that would protect transgender people. As Professor William Eskridge points out, ultimately,
“laws against cross-dressing were undermined by cultural acceptance of
women’s freedom to wear comfortable men’s clothing.”167 Similarly, as
the hysteria around transgender people’s existence subsides, restrictive
and discriminatory bathroom policies will go the way of the crossdressing laws.
Many of the courts that sided with the defendants in cross-dressing
cases did so because of an understanding of these changing gender roles
and the corresponding declining importance of maintaining them. Just as
bathroom cases described the presence of transgender people in bath
rooms as “disconcerting”—as if people had a legal right to impose their
social norms on others in order to be free from psychic disturbance—in
City of Chicago v. Wilson, the court correctly identified the city’s argu
ment that cross-dressing by transgender people offended the public’s
“aesthetic preferences” as merely a justification for a prohibitive city
ordinance. The court held
the city has not articulated the manner in which the ordinance is de
signed to protect the public morals. It is presumably believed that
cross-dressing in public is offensive to the general public’s aesthetic
preference. There is no evidence, however, that cross-dressing,
when done as a part of a preoperative therapy program or otherwise,
is, in and of itself, harmful to society. In this case, the aesthetic pre
ference of society must be balanced against the individual’s well
being.168

The court’s ultimate balancing in Wilson is precisely what is needed
in the bathroom cases. When the well-being of someone in nondiscrimi
natory and safe access to a bathroom is balanced against society’s socalled comfort, founded in fear and misunderstanding of those with less
traditional gender presentation, the reasoning of Wilson urges valuing the
humanity of a marginalized person over the aesthetic preference of socie
ty at large. This is especially true given: (1) the impermanence of social
norms of appearance, particularly gender-based ones; and (2) the ephe
meral nature of the gendered biological assumptions behind the norms.
The impermanence of social norms is obvious when viewed through a
historical lens. Although seeing women in pants would have been dis
167. ESKRIDGE, supra note 91, at 226.
168. Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978) (It should be noted that the court did
not find the law to be invalid on its face, but only as applied to transgender people.).
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concerting and offensive to many people 100 years ago, today it is ordi
nary, commonplace, and likely offensive only to a very small number of
people.
Despite what seems like an obvious choice in valuing humanity
over fleeting aesthetic comfort, at the root of the opposition to transgend
er bathroom equality lies the idea that sex-segregated bathrooms are
meant for different groups of people based on their real or perceived
physiological differences. This idea, that a real or perceived “genital
test” motivates the bathroom debate, is simply untrue, as demonstrated in
the informal policing of bathrooms.
According to a survey conducted by the Transgender Law Center,
butch women or femme men who attempt to use a bathroom are fre
quently subjected to the same types of harassment and discrimination as
transgender people.169 It is common for many women who appear ste
reotypically masculine or insufficiently stereotypically feminine (wheth
er a transgender or non-transgender woman), to be confronted by women
and asked to confirm their anatomical or biological female identity.170
That request for confirmation is simply for a verbal affirmation that the
person is female, an affirmation that would impliedly confirm that the
person perceived to be male has female genitals. For example, it is the
experience of the author of this Article with the traditionally female
name that when confronted in a bathroom by someone who presumes her
to be male based on her gender presentation, a simple, “I am not in the
wrong bathroom,” successfully diffuses the stated opposition to her pres
ence.
If such affirmation is made, then the objection to the masculineappearing woman’s use of the facilities is withdrawn. No change of ap
pearance needs to take place; nor would the person confronted actually
have to verbally, much less visually, confirm having female genitals. It
is hard in the extreme to understand or articulate how the confirmation of
the presence or absence of female genitals provides any real information
whatsoever about the so-called offensive individual and why the non
verbal, non-explicit confirmation does enough to assuage any raised con
cerns.
In the formal context of the cross-dressing cases, these two prin
ciples of changing social norms and even the ephemeral nature of gen
dered biological assumptions root the courts’ vagueness analysis. In one
case, the court held that “[t]he defect is that the terms of the ordinance,
‘dress not belonging to his or her sex,’ when considered in the light of
169. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, GENDER NEUTRAL BATHROOM SURVEY (2001),
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/sbac_survey.pdf.
170. Id.
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contemporary dress habits, make it ‘so vague that men of common intel
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica
tion.’”171 Other courts rejected similar ordinances for the same reason.172
Courts also emphasized the risk of arbitrary enforcement posed by such a
vague law. One court held that “[s]uch boundless discretion granted by
the ordinance encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the
law. It provides a convenient instrument for harsh and discriminatory
enforcement by prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed
to merit their displeasure.”173
Similarly, in the formal context as it plays out in bathrooms, prohi
bitions preventing transgender people from using a gender-concordant
restroom are based on a standard that is impermissibly vague. Police
officers may purport to use a “know it when I see it” approach to gender,
but that is often as arbitrary as the cross-dressing laws. The genital test
or, more accurately, the perceived-genital test that police claim to use is
just as arbitrarily and inconsistently enforced. Police and employers (as
in the Goins case) even ignore a state’s vital records laws that grant legal
status to change of gender.
In practice, legal authorities frequently do not rely on a genital
test—much less a chromosome test—to determine who is a man or a
woman. This was clearly demonstrated in a 2009 federal civil rights case
brought by a female prisoner with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia.174
Though chromosomally female, the plaintiff’s condition led to “a hor
monal imbalance which typically results in females assuming certain
male characteristics,” including “ambiguous external genitalia” and fa
cial hair.175 Despite pleading with officials to place her in the women’s
ward and presenting a doctor’s note that she was indeed chromosomally
female, the prison placed her in the “alternative lifestyle ward” among
gay men and male-to-female transgender people. During the day, this
ward mixed freely with the men’s ward. In addition, the plaintiff was
repeatedly strip-searched by male prison guards against her wishes that a
171. Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ohio 1975).
172. D.C. v. St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting prior case law holding that
the phrase “indecent or lewd behavior” was not vague, and holding, instead, that a cross-dressing
law was, in fact, unconstitutionally vague because the law failed to provide adequate and explicit
enforcement guidelines); Cross-Dress Law Falls, ADVOCATE, Sept.24, 1975, at 10 (Detroit judge
held law void for vagueness. Notably, a fashion writer for the Detroit Free Press testified as an ex
pert witness that “the distinction between male and female clothing has blurred tremendously
and . . . clothes have become sexless.”).
173. Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974) (citing Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)).
174. Tucker v. Evans, No. 07-CV-14429, 2009 WL 799175, at *1 (E.D. Mich. March 24,
2009).
175. Id.
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female guard perform the searches.176 Despite all of this, the court
granted the prison’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the
plaintiff had failed to show that defendants should have known she was
female and “crucially, plaintiff admitted that she did not appear to be
female.”177 Even when authorities purport to be following a physiologi
cal rule to determine someone’s gender, genotype is not what they ac
tually use.
The bathroom and cross-dressing jurisprudence highlights the com
plicated nature of gender and sex and why transgender people must be
accorded the same respect as non-transgender people in making that de
termination. In Kastl v. Maricopa Community College, the court rejected
the defendant’s argument for a genital test to determine bathroom access.
In that case, as discussed above, the plaintiff argued that though she pos
sessed male genitals, she was a “biological female.”178 The court pointed
out, “plaintiff has stated that she is a biological woman. She lives and
presents herself as a woman, and offered her state-issued driver’s license
to the defendant as proof of her biological sex . . . .”179 Yet, this wasn’t
enough for the defendant, who required “proof” of the plaintiff’s genit
als. In holding for the plaintiff, the court reasoned that “were this infor
mation truly necessary to preserve the single-sex nature of the defen
dant’s restrooms and the safety and privacy of their users, surely it would
be sought from each person prior to granting restroom access,” not just
transsexual employees.180 While the defendant argued that it had “a
compelling interest in enforcing sex-segregated use of its restrooms in
order to preserve the safety and privacy of all users,” the court rejected
the idea that it was constitutionally permissible to demand information
about the plaintiff’s genitalia to carry out that mission.181
The court further rejected the genital test, reasoning that
genitalia is not the sole indicator of sex. While information con
cerning an individual’s genitalia may assist Defendant in assigning
that person to the restroom of a particular sex, reliance on that in
formation to the exclusion of other offers of proof might lead to in
accurate determinations of sex. Obtaining information about Plain
tiff’s genitalia when her sex has otherwise been established there

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531, 2004 WL 2008954, at *1
(D. Ariz. 2004).
179. Id. at *6.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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fore cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to the Defendant’s inter
est in determining sex for restroom use purposes.182

In addition, for the cross-dressing cases, courts accepted a Gender
Identity Disorder diagnosis to be sufficient to warrant gender-appropriate
clothing and bathroom usage even when the individuals had not under
gone genital surgery. In Doe v. McConn, for instance, the court made it
quite clear that the plaintiffs were “fully diagnosed transsexuals who, as
of the commencement of this cause of action, had not undergone sexual
reassignment surgery.”183 In the words of a contemporary account, the
ruling held that the law was unconstitutional because “cross-dressing was
an important part of therapy for people undergoing sex change.”184 It is
important to note as well that, as the dissent in City of Chicago v. Wilson
points out, the majority opinion in that case took for granted the transgender parties’ participation in a psychiatric and medical treatment pro
gram.
The only testimony in support of the defendants’ claim was that of
the defendants themselves. No psychiatrist was called to testify that
the defendants had been diagnosed as transsexuals or that crossdressing had been prescribed as preoperative therapy. No letter or
statement was offered in evidence. Neither defendant named the
psychiatrist from whom he was receiving treatment. Indeed, the de
fendant Wilson, on cross-examination, testified that he didn’t know
what sex-reassignment surgery would involve and said he did not
know the doctor who would perform it.185

Also, as pointed out in the cross-dressing cases, the vital records
laws of most states permit a change of legal gender status.186 Forty

182. Id.
183. Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
184. For the Record—Short Takes: Houston, ADVOCATE, Aug 20, 1981, at 12 (discussing
McConn).
185. Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978) (Ward, C.J., dissenting). This high
lights an important fact: For many transgender people, in particular low-income people of color,
access to medical and mental health practitioners is limited. A transgender person’s gender identity
is properly assumed to be correct based on their testimony alone.
186. “The jurisdictions that have gender reclassification policies for birth certificates also differ
in their treatment of reclassified birth certificates. Some jurisdictions provide a new certificate with
the changed information in place of the original information [Arizona, California, Colorado, Con
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York (state), North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington], [O]thers provide a certificate where the
old information is visible but crossed out [Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon
tana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia],
and others leave it up to the discretion of a judge whether the certificate will be amended or a new
one will be issued to replace it [Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Dakota,
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seven states permit transgender people to modify their birth certificates
and other official documents to reflect change of gender, including those
with transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination laws that have penalized
transgender people for using the appropriate bathroom. To then bar
those people from using the right bathroom places them in the untenable
position of having no bathroom to use.
In City of Chicago v. Wilson, the court noted that it made little
sense for the state to recognize sex reassignment surgery in its vital
records laws but then punish those dressing in accordance with their
gender identity. The court reasoned that since the vital records law
authorizes the issuance of a new certificate of birth following sexreassignment surgery, the legislature has implicitly recognized the
necessity and validity of such surgery. It would be inconsistent to
permit sex-reassignment surgery yet, at the same time, impede the
necessary therapy in preparation for such surgery. Individuals con
templating such surgery should, in consultation with their doctors,
be entitled to pursue the therapy necessary to insure the correctness
of their decision.187

Similarly, in a 2005 immigration case, the Board of Immigration
Appeals held that “The Defense of Marriage Act does not preclude, for
purposes of Federal law, recognition of a marriage involving a post
operative transsexual, where the marriage is considered by the State in
which it was performed as one between two individuals of the opposite
sex.”188
VI. CONCLUSION
The past twenty years have witnessed a revolution in transgender
equality. More states are passing transgender-inclusive nondiscrimina
tion laws, more corporations are enacting protections for gender identity
and expression, and more Americans are taking up the fight for the
equality of their transgender neighbors and friends. Yet, if transgender
people cannot access appropriate bathrooms, then they truly cannot par
ticipate fully in our society.
In the cross-dressing cases and the bathroom cases, the same faulty
arguments are offered to support bathroom discrimination: (1) that these
laws are necessary to prevent crime; (2) that they are a safeguard against
fraud; (3) that society’s gender norms should be protected; and (4) that
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming].” Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731,
770 (2008).
187. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d at 533–34.
188. Matter of Lovo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746 (B.I.A. 2005).
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they are a way to discourage homosexuality. The courts of the 1970s
struck down the cross-dressing laws and rejected these arguments as un
constitutional. We have made the case in this Article that courts must
recognize that these legally infirm arguments are no more proper in the
bathroom context.

